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IS THIS REALLY
NECESSARY?
FORCED DISSEMINATION OF
INFORMATION ABOUT
CONSUMER ORGANIZATIONS:
LESSONS FROM
ILLINOIS' EXPERIENCE

by Steven F. Pflaum*
Introduction
In the Summer 1988 edition of the
California Regulatory Law Reporter,
Kenneth C. Crowley examined government efforts to strengthen consumers'
representation in public utility regulatory
proceedings by requiring the inclusion
of messages regarding consumer groups
in utility billing statements. 1 That subject-and broader issues related to the
government's ability to require someone
to disseminate information intended to
assist organizations opposed to that person's interest-are particularly timely in
light of the California voters' recent
passage of Proposition 103. 2 The California initiative measure enacts a broad
range of reforms to the state's insurance
industry, including a requirement that
automobile insurance companies enclose
with their policy renewal statements a
notice regarding the existence of an
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organization that represents consumers'
interests in insurance-related matters.3
The history of Illinois' efforts to promote its legislatively created Citizens
Utility Board (CUB)-initially, by authorizing CUB to include messages in public
utility billing statements, and later, by
permitting CUB to distribute promotional materials in mailings by state agenciesoffers important lessons to those in California who support or oppose efforts to
promote consumer organizations. As explained below, that history counsels
against uncritical acceptance of Mr.
Crowley's conclusion that CUBs can
avoid the First Amendment issues inherent in forced disclosure schemes by
arguing that they are merely acting as
an arm of the government. Moreover,
the Illinois experience offers an alternative means of effectively promoting consumer organizations that does not
impose forced disclosure requirements
on the ideological opponents of those
organizations.

Limitations on the
"Arm-of-Government" Argument
Crowley's "primary recommendation"
for achieving the goal of implementing
"a comprehensive insert program which
will best benefit consumers and withstand constitutional scrutiny" is to grant
state-created CUBs access to utilities'
billing envelopes. 4 Crowley's recommendation is based on his belief that the
strictures of Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
v. Public Utilities Comm 'n, 5 a U.S.
Supreme Court decision holding unconstitutional a California Public Utilities
Commission order granting a private
consumer organization the right to include promotional materials in a utility's
billing envelopes, do not apply to statecreated consumer groups. 6 The discussion below reveals that Crowley's
argument overstates the importance, for
purposes of constitutional analysis, of
the public or private status of the organization whose messages are disseminated.
The Constitutionality of Forced Dissemination of a Governmentally Pre-

scribed Message. Relying on language
in PG&E recognizing that the state has
"substantial leeway in determining appropriate information disclosure requirements for business corporations, " 7
Crowley argues that enclosures in utility
billing statements from a state-created
consumer organization would constitute
a permissible "legal notice.''8 However,
as Crowley himself recognizes, this argument was rejected by the Seventh Circuit
in Central Illinois Light Co. v. Citizens
Utility Board. 9 That lawsuit involved a
challenge by Illinois public utilities to
provisions in the Illinois Citizens Utility
Board Act 10that required the utilities,
up to four times per year, to include
with their billing statement messages
from the Citizens Utility Board. 11 Unlike
TURN, the private citizens' organization
which benefited from access to a utility's
billing envelopes in PG&E, the Illinois
CUB is "a nonprofit public body corporate and politic. " 12 The court of appeals
nevertheless held that "[t]he statutory
scheme created by [the CUB Act]. ..is, in
all material respects, constitutionally
indistinguishable from the CPUC order
struck down by the Court in Pacific
Gas." 13
While there are other grounds for
disagreeing with the outcome of Central
Illinois Light, 14 the district court in that
case correctly held that "negative free
speech" rights not to participate in the
communication of messages with which
one disagrees include the right not to
promote objectionable messages from
public, as well as private, entities. 15
This principle is illustrated by the
Supreme Court's 1943 decision in the
"flag-salute case," West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, 16 in
which the Court held unconstitutional a
state-imposed requirement that all children attending public schools recite the
Pledge of Allegiance. The plaintiffs,
Jehovah's Witnesses, considered the
Pledge to violate their religious beliefs.
Writing for the Court, Justice Jackson
recognized the plaintiff's right not to
participate in the dissemination of the
state's prescribed message: "If there is
any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion or force citizens
to confess by word or act their faith
therein. " 17
Wooley v. Maynard 18 made it clear
that the constitutional prohibition
against forced dissemination of the government's ideological messages applies
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even where the speaker is not required
to affirm his or her acceptance of the
government's views. In Wooley, some
New Hampshire residents challenged a
law requiring them to display the state
motto, "Live Free or Die," on their
vehicle license plates. Unlike compelled
recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance,
display of the state motto on license
plates does not require affirmation of
the state's message. The Court found
this distinction to be irrelevant, holding
that "[t]he First Amendment protects
the right of individuals ... to refuse to
foster, in the way New Hampshire commands, an idea they find morally objectionable. " 19 The Court described the
essence of the constitutional violation in
both Barnette and Wooley as the requirement that someone "be an instrument for fostering public adherence to
an ideological point of view he finds
unacceptable. ''2° It makes no difference
that the objectionable ideological point
of view happens to belong to the government.
Consequently, the applicability of the
legal notices exception to the constitutional prohibition against forced dissemination of speech depends on more than
just the public or private status of the
person whose message one is compelled
to disseminate. As explained below, the
content and, possibly, the purpose of
that message-that is, whether (I) it contains ideological speech or merely factual,
uncontroversial information; and (2) the
message is intended to prevent deceptive
commercial speech by the person who is
forced to disseminate that message, or
promote the interests of that person's
ideological opponent-determine whether
or not the message is a permissible legal
notice.

Applicability of the Legal Notices
Exception: The Zauderer Doctrine. The
leading case regarding the constitutionality of compelled dissemination of legal
·notices is Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counse/.2 1 Zauderer arose out
of an attorney disciplinary proceeding
regarding alleged violations of various
Ohio disciplinary rules pertaining to
attorney advertising, including one rule
that required lawyer advertisements to
disclose that clients in contingency fee
cases could be liable for significant litigation costs even if their lawsuits were
unsuccessful. In upholding this forced
disclosure rule, the Court stressed that
Ohio was simply requiring the lawyer to
"include in his advertising purely factual
and uncontroversial information about
the terms under which his services will
be available. Because the expansion of
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First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the
value to consumers of the information
such speech provides, ... appellant's constitutionally protected interest in not
providing any particular factual information in his advertising is minimal. " 22
The scope of this holding remains
unclear. Although the PG&E plurality
held that Zauderer was inapplicable to
the ideological messages that TURN was
authorized to distribute, it broadly characterized the Zauderer holding: "The
State, of course, has substantial leeway
in determining appropriate information
disclosure requirements for business corporations. Sec Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinar.r Counsel, 471 U.S. 626,651
(1985). Nothing in Zauderer suggests.
however. that the State is equally free to
require corporations to carry the messages
of third parties, where the messages
themselves are biased against or are expressly contrary to the corporation's
views."23
After PG&E, the crucial issue regarding the scope of the legal notices exception is whether, under that doctrine, (a)
one may be forced to disseminate information about one's ideological opponent
as long as that information is factual
and uncontroversial, or (b) one may
only be forced to disseminate factual
information necessary to avoid the possibility that one's own commercial speech
could be deceptive. Once again, the experience with lllinois'CUB Act is illuminating. In Central lffinois Light, the
Seventh Circuit held that, "[w]hile Zauderer holds that sellers can be forced to
declare information about themselves
needed to avoid deception, it does not
suggest that companies can be made
into involuntary solicitors for their
idealogical [sic] opponents. " 24 If the
Seventh Circuit's holding is correct, it
bodes ill for any attempt-through "legal
notices," consumer advocacy check-off
inserts, or otherwise 25 -to require utilities (or anyone else) to participate in
efforts to assist their opponents. All
such efforts involve requiring persons to
serve as "involuntary solicitors" for
their opponents.
However, there is reason to question
such a narrow interpretation of Zauderer.
The Court in PG&E could have easily
rejected TU RN's reliance on Zauderer
by holding that the legal notices exception was limited to commercial speech
and did not apply to disclosures intended
to assist the utility's opponents. Instead,
the Court stressed the ideological content ofTURN's messages, observing that
"the messages themselves are biased
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against or are expressly contrary to the
corporation's views."2~ That language
would appear to leave open the possibility that it would have been permissible,
under Zauderer, to require the utility to
carry "factual and uncontroversial" 27
inserts from TURN.
A broader interpretation of Zauderer
-one that would apply a deferential
standard of review to forced dissemination of factual information about the
disseminator's ideological opponentsis also consistent with the concern repeatedly expressed by the Court in other
negative free speech cases about the
compelled dissemination of ideological
speech. 28 Perhaps due to the CUB Act's
express limitations on the content of the
speech in CUB's enclosures, 29 the Seventh Circuit's Central !ffinois Light
decision does not focus on the nature of
the speech that the utilities were being
forced to disseminate. Instead, that decision appears to be implicitly based on
protecting utilities' "negative freedom of
association rights"- -that is, their freedom
not to be "associated" in their billing
statements with a group that they oppose.Jo
This reasoning rests on questionable
constitutional footing. Prior forced association cases have tended to involve some
form of impact on free speech rights.Ji
Consequently, unless forced association
with an opponent's factual and uncontroversial messages necessarily infringes
free speech rights, that form of forced
association may be permissible.-12

Testing the Limits of Zauderer: The
Forced Disclosure Provisions of Proposition 103. The forced disclosure requirements in California's insurance
reform initiative, Proposition 103, may
provide an opportunity to determine the
limits of the Zauderer decision. Proposition 103 adds section 1861. l0(c) to
California's Insurance Code, which states
in pertinent part:
"( c )(I) The [California insurance] commissioner shall require
every insurer to enclose notices in
every policy or renewal premium
bill informing policyholders of the
opportunity to join an independent, non-profit corporation which
shall advocate the interests of
insurance consumers in any forum.
This organization shall be established by an interim board of public members designated by the
commissioner and operated by
individuals who are democratically
elected from its membership ....
(2) The commissioner shall by
regulation determine the content
of the enclosures and other pro-
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cedures necessary for implementation of this provision .... "JJ
Proposition l03's express limitation
on the content of the notices to "informing policyholders of the opportunity to
join an independent, non-profit corporation which shall advocate the interests
of insurance consumers in any forum"
would appear to ensure that the notices
will consist solely of "factual and uncontroversial information. "3 4 Moreover,
unlike the forced disclosure schemes
invalidated in PG&E and Central
Illinois Light, Proposition 103 contains
an additional safeguard against ideological messages by providing that the text
of the messages will be determined in
the first instance by a presumably neutral government officiaJ.35 Assuming
that this forced disclosure requirement
is reasonably related to a legitimate state
interest, section 1861.10(c) should, therefore, be constitutional unless, as the
Seventh Circuit has concluded, Zauderer
does not sanction requiring insurance
companies to "be made into involuntary
solicitors for their idealogical [sic]
opponents. "36
Although several lawsuits have been
filed against various provisions of Proposition 103, the constitutionality of the
forced disclosure provision in Insurance
Code section 1861.lO(c) does not presently appear to be a focus of those
challenges. However, if an authoritative
decision of the constitutionality of that
provision ever were rendered, it likely
would determine the validity of any
forced disclosure provisions, including
more modest programs such as consumer
advocacy check-offs.3 7 In short, Proposition I03 provides an ideal opportunity
to determine whether or not Zauderer
authorizes forcing someone to disseminate factual and uncontroversial information about an ideological opponent.

An Alternative Solution:
Distributing Notices Through
State Mailings
Following the invalidation of the
Illinois CUB Act's forced disclosure provision in the Central Illinois Light litigation, the Illinois General Assembly
passed a statute intended to provide
another means of promoting the Illinois
CUB. 38 The new law authorizes CUB to
submit enclosures in certain mass mailings by state agencies, such as income
tax refunds and driver's license renewals.39
By not requiring the utilities to participate in efforts intended to assist their
ideological opponent, the Illinois statute
largely avoids the First Amendment
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issues inherent in any forced access provision.
There are, to be sure, some obvious
limitations to the Illinois approach. First,
one would expect that including inserts
about a utility consumers organization
in, for example, vehicle license plate
renewals would not be as effective in
promoting that organization as including
such inserts in utility bills. Nevertheless,
the new Illinois law has proven successful. With the assistance of inserts in
state mailings, the Illinois CUB has been
averaging more than 4,000 new members
per month and has reached a total membership of more than 100,000. 40 CUB is
receiving approximately the same response rate that it did to its previous
enclosures in utility billing statements. 41
Second, there are practical limits to
the number of different consumer organizations-even state-created organizationsthat can be promoted in state mailings.
The approach taken by Proposition I03,
on the other hand, has the advantage of
being adaptable to establish and promote
state-created consumer organizations in
a virtually unlimited number of areas,
leaving open the possibility that similar
groups and similar compelled disclosure
provisions could be created in areas of
interest to consumers such as health
care, product liability, and financial
counseling, among others.
On balance, I believe that, at least
until the constitutionality of the kind of
forced disclosure scheme contained in
Proposition 103 is clearly established,
the stronger constitutional basis for the
state-mailing concept employed in Illinois outweighs the potential advantages
of any forced-disclosure scheme. The
Illinois model warrants serious consideration by those seeking to strengthen the
voice of consumers in public utility matters and other important consumer issues.

Conclusion
Illinois' experience with its Citizens
Utility Board reveals that, rather than
turning on the public or private status
of the consumer group whose message is
disseminated, the constitutionality of
forced-access schemes to promote consumer organizations is likely to turn on
the authorized content of the messages
and whether or not the legal notices
exception extends to disclosures intended
to assist the ideological opponents of
the disclosing parties. The Illinois experience is also noteworthy for its successful
pioneering of a means of promoting its
CUB that largely avoids the potential
constitutional problems inherent in forced
disclosure schemes.
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